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Dilemmas of citizenship:  Young people’s conceptions of un/employment rights 
and responsibilities. 
 
Abstract 
This paper draws on the concept of ideological dilemmas in order to explore how 
a sample of young people constructed potentially contrary themes of liberal 
citizenship in discussions of un/employment.  The study took place in the context 
of recent policy developments in the UK which have sought to place a renewed 
emphasis upon notions of responsible citizenship in relation to both welfare and 
education policy.  A total of 58 participants were interviewed in 24 semi-
structured group interviews.  In response to direct questions on un/employment, 
participants could resolve dilemmas concerning welfare rights and the 
responsibility to contribute to society by emphasising a criterion of effortfulness, 
thereby adopting a primarily individualistic explanation of unemployment.  In 
other contexts however, this could be replaced by an emphasis on social 
explanations of unemployment.  In particular, participants could treat immigration 
as a cause of unemployment.  These findings are interpreted in terms of people’s 
capacity to construct rhetorical strategies based upon different ideological themes 
in particular contexts.  They are discussed in relation to previous research on 
social policy discourse and recent debates regarding the appropriateness of 
seeking to identify ideological themes in discourse. 
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Dilemmas of citizenship:  Young people’s conceptions of un/employment 
rights and responsibilities. 
 
 Existing work in sociology and social policy which has sought to 
investigate ordinary understandings of citizenship has tended to find that 
individuals draw upon different, and sometimes contradictory, conceptions of 
citizenship (e.g. Lister et al, 2003; Dean, 2004; Dwyer, 2002).  At present, 
analysts’ responses to such empirical findings tend to be either to attempt to trace 
a consistency between apparently contradictory statements (e.g. Dwyer, 2002) or 
simply to observe that ‘popular discourse is usually chaotic and often 
contradictory’ (Dean, 2004, p. 68).  Such observations may reflect the fact that 
extant sociological and social policy analyses, however sophisticated their 
theoretical approaches, may make problematic assumptions regarding human 
discursive consciousness.  Specifically, the assumption that variability in accounts 
can be taken as evidence of contradiction in underlying thoughts, attitudes or 
beliefs has been challenged by discursive and rhetorical approaches to social 
psychology (e.g. Billig, 1987; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), which have been 
influential in recent social psychological work on citizenship (e.g. Abell et al, 
2006; Barnes et al, 2004; Condor, 2006a; Condor & Gibson, 2007; Hopkins et al, 
2003). 
The present paper draws in particular on the concept of ideological 
dilemmas (Billig et al, 1988) in order to focus on the way in which the frequently 
opposing themes of citizenship ideologies may be constructed, argued over and 
resolved by social actors themselves in relation to un/employment and welfare. 
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Ideological dilemmas 
 Billig et al (1988) introduced their analysis of ideological dilemmas as an 
alternative to approaches which treat ideology as monolithic and deterministic of 
human thought and action, and instead emphasised the ways in which social actors 
could draw flexibly on competing ideological themes.  For present purposes, two 
features of Billig et al’s argument are particularly pertinent:  First, their distinction 
between intellectual and lived ideology; and second, their conceptualisation of 
ideology as inherently dilemmatic. 
 
Intellectual and lived ideology:  Billig et al (1988) drew upon a longstanding 
distinction between ideology as formal, systematised philosophy, and ideology as 
a form of everyday commonsense which can in some respects be said to be almost 
synonymous with the concept of culture.  The former, intellectual ideology, 
locates the essence of any given ideology in the works of ‘great theorists’ (1988, 
p. 28) associated with that tradition.  Conversely, the latter, lived ideology, directs 
our attention towards the commonsense practices of ordinary social actors. 
 
Dilemmas of ideology:  Billig et al further argued that rather than 
necessarily constituting internally coherent systems, ideologies (both lived and 
intellectual) may instead be more fruitfully conceptualised as characterised by 
contrary themes and dilemmas.  For example, Billig et al noted that the common 
social scientific assumption that capitalism is marked by an all-encompassing 
individualism neglects the extent to which contrary themes can be drawn upon as 
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‘strictures against selfishness and lack of social responsibility’ (1988, p. 35).  
Similarly, they cite Edelman’s (1977) study of political language which suggests 
that lived ideology is characterised by both individualistic and social explanations 
of poverty:  ‘On the one hand people share the myth that the poor are to blame for 
their own plight:  themes of drunkenness, laziness and weakness of individual 
character figure largely in this mythology … [but t]here is another social myth, 
which expresses sympathy with the poor as helpless victims of an unjust society’ 
(Billig et al, 1988, p. 40-41).  This is not to suggest that such themes will always 
be accorded equal weight, and some previous research (e.g. Dean, 2004) has 
found that contemporary popular discourse concerning welfare tends to prioritise 
individualism, with only a ‘residual’ place for more ‘solidaristic’ themes.  
However, Billig et al (1988) point out that even when some themes may appear to 
dominate over others, we should expect the counter themes to be evident, for the 
very formulation of an argument presumes that counter-arguments are possible 
(cf. Billig, 1987). 
 This necessarily brief outline of Billig et al’s (1988) perspective is of 
course unable to do justice to the many subtleties and complexities of their 
arguments and analyses.  Nevertheless, this summary does draw our attention to 
two aspects of the approach that may be susceptible to recent critiques of work 
which seeks to identify ideological themes in discourse.  The first concerns the 
distinction between intellectual and lived ideology, and the second concerns the 
very enterprise of identifying ideologies in discourse itself. 
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From ‘intellectual’ and ‘lived’ ideology to ‘in theory’ and ‘in practice’ accounts:  
The distinction between the realms of the ‘intellectual’ and the ‘everyday’ may be 
problematic insofar as ‘intellectual’ work can be seen to be based upon routine 
and mundane ‘everyday’ practices (e.g. Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986).  
Similarly, as Billig et al (1988) acknowledge, it would be surprising if the themes 
of cultural commonsense within the particular socio-historical context in which 
‘great theorists’ were writing did not themselves become embedded within their 
formal texts.  The distinction between intellectual and lived ideology might 
therefore be usefully re-located at the level of discourse itself.  Rather than 
representing different modes of discourse produced by, on the one hand, ‘great 
theorists’, and on the other hand, ‘ordinary’ folk, we might seek to explore the 
ways in which any speaker talks about social issues in theory and in practice. 
Of relevance here is Potter and Litton’s (1985) critique of social 
representations research in which they highlighted an important distinction 
between representations which are used in the explanation of some event or 
phenomenon, and those which are merely mentioned (e.g. in order to dismiss 
them).  Amongst explanations that are used, Potter and Litton drew a further 
distinction between use in theory and use in practice.  It is important to note that 
this distinction need not map directly onto different ‘types’ of discourse.  The 
identification of utterances as in theory or in practice thus depends more on the 
way in which the concept of interest is invoked in whatever interaction is being 
analysed.  Whereas the former involve accounts provided at a more general level 
of abstraction, which may be used to explain the phenomenon of interest itself 
(e.g. explanations of the causes of unemployment formulated as generalities), the 
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latter may involve explanations worked up in order to explain why some other 
issue or concern is desirable, problematic, irrelevant, or whatever (e.g. invoking 
unemployment in the course of arguing against immigration).  Essentially, the 
difference can be seen as that between talking directly about a concept or issue (in 
theory), and invoking it in the course of discussing some other concept or issue (in 
practice). 
 This begins to direct our attention towards the importance of action 
orientation – a central tenet of discursive work – which refers to the functional 
aspects of discourse (cf. Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  In discussing any given social 
issue, there are likely to be multiple actions being performed on a moment-by-
moment basis.  For example, in the context of research interview talk, we would 
expect the talk of both interviewer and interviewee to be oriented towards 
bringing off the interview as a particular type of institutional discursive 
accomplishment (see e.g. Potter & Hepburn, 2005).  As part of this process we 
might find a range of specific interpersonal actions being performed (e.g. 
questioning, answering, identity management) in the local interactional context.  
Over and above this, we might also expect to see people’s talk being oriented 
towards more distal ideological functions, such as holding a particular group to 
account for some social problem or other.  Although such formulations might also 
be oriented toward some piece of discursive business in the immediate 
interactional context, ideological functions are equally important insofar as they 
have the potential to reproduce inequalities on a broader scale.  For example, the 
blaming of another group for some state of affairs might serve to manage 
accountability in the presence of a social science researcher, but equally it could 
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constitute yet another representation of that particular group as being a ‘problem’, 
and in this respect contribute in some small way to the maintenance of the group’s 
disadvantage or stigmatization.  Condor (2006b) has pointed to the tendency of 
social psychologists to assume that this occurs by virtue of something akin to a 
‘magical’ process, and indeed the role of each such usage in the maintenance of 
broader social relations is difficult, if not impossible, to track.  However, writ 
large such constructions bolster inequalities and exclusion in the ways identified 
by numerous discursive researchers (e.g. Dixon et al., 1994; Wetherell & Potter, 
1992).  This latter aspect of the functionality of discourse brings us to the second 
point of engagement with critiques of discursive work which seeks to address 
issues of ideology. 
 
Interaction, ideology or both?:  A focus for debate amongst conversation analysts 
and discursive and rhetorical psychologists over the last decade or so has 
concerned the appropriateness of seeking to identify cultural or ideological themes 
in discourse (e.g. Billig, 1999a, b; Schegloff, 1997, 1998, 1999a, b; Wetherell, 
1998; Wooffitt, 2005).  Related to these debates are a series of criticisms of the 
use of interview methods in discourse analytic work (e.g. Edwards & Stokoe, 
2004; Potter & Hepburn, 2005).  Rather than seeing these debates as dealing with 
two discrete issues, it is preferable to highlight their inter-relatedness in the way 
described by Wooffitt (2005, p. 172), who points to ‘a notable tendency in 
Foucauldian and critical discourse analytic studies of interview data to focus on 
the respondents’ turns as if they were discrete speech events isolated from the 
stream of social interaction in which they were produced.’ 
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Several of the criticisms of the derivation of ideological themes from 
interview data are well made insofar as many analyses of ideology in discourse 
would indeed benefit from increased attention to local context.  However, from 
the point of view of approaches which have sought to draw links between 
discourse and ideology the response has been to suggest that granting analytic 
primacy to the local context of interaction is equally as problematic as its neglect 
(e.g. Edley, 2005; Wetherell, 1998). 
 The challenge therefore becomes one of avoiding, as far as possible, the 
twin perils of interactional and ideological determinism, and it is here that the 
concept of ideological dilemmas may be of particular use given its emphasis on 
the active nature of the relationship between ideology and discourse.  Rather than 
treating ideological themes as relatively passively infusing people’s talk, the 
concept of ideological dilemmas points the analyst towards an attention to the 
ways in which people need to actively construct and re-construct ideology anew in 
any given moment of interaction.  Rather than reflecting a monolithic, unitary 
conception of some ideology or other which simply determines the talk of 
individual social actors, ideology is conceived of as a range of potentially 
conflicting tropes which are actively constructed by speakers in the course of 
performing some piece of discursive business within a specific interactional 
context. 
 The particular focus of the present paper will be on the utility of this 
approach in analysing the social citizenship talk of young people in relation to 
un/employment.  Before presenting the analysis, however, it is necessary to briefly 
outline why the un/employment discourse of these young people in northern 
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England may be particularly fertile territory for the analysis of competing 
ideological themes in citizenship discourse. 
 
Rights and responsibilities, un/employment, and citizenship education 
Recent UK government approaches to social citizenship in general, and 
un/employment welfare in particular, have tended to reflect Giddens’s (1998, p. 
65) ‘motto’ for Third Way politics of ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (italics in 
original).  Welfare provision has thus been made increasingly contingent upon 
individuals recognising and meeting a range of responsibilities (see e.g. Clarke, 
2005; Dwyer, 2000, 2004; Lister, 2002; Lund, 1999).  For example, since 2002 the 
entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance – and indeed to a range of other benefits – 
has been contingent upon the individual attending regular meetings with an 
adviser at Job Centre Plus (Dwyer, 2004).  Indeed, the continued use of the term 
‘Jobseeker’s Allowance’ in policy discourse, rather than alternatives such as 
‘unemployment benefit’, indicate that the unemployed individual is expected to be 
actively seeking employment in order to claim.  Such policies tend to reinforce the 
message identified by Lister (2002, p. 127) that paid employment constituted the 
New Labour government’s ‘supreme citizenship responsibility’ (see also 
Fairclough, 2000). 
 In a related policy development, 2002 saw the introduction of Citizenship 
Education to the National Curriculum in England following the report of the 
Advisory Group on Citizenship (1998).  This report employed a conceptualisation 
of citizenship which placed renewed emphasis on individual responsibility (see 
e.g. Osler & Starkey, 2005).  These moves towards emphasising responsibility in 
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both citizenship education and welfare policy raise questions about precisely how 
young people themselves conceptualise social citizenship rights and 
responsibilities.  However, existing survey research exploring young people’s 
conceptions of citizenship tends not to cover un/employment rights and 
responsibilities – and indeed social citizenship in general – in any great depth (e.g. 
Haste & Hogan, 2006; Kennedy, 2007; Kerr et al, 2002; Lopes et al., 2009).  The 
present study therefore aims to address questions concerning young people’s 
conceptions of un/employment rights and responsibilities through an analysis of a 
sample of 14-16 year-olds’ research interview talk, collected in the first stage of a 
larger study of young people’s citizenship discourse in England (see also Gibson 
& Hamilton, in press). 
 
Method 
Participants 
The present study involved 24 semi-structured group interviews with 14-
16 year-old children (school years 10 and 11).  A total of 58 children from four 
different schools (three state schools and one private school) in northern England 
took part in the research.  Of these, 16 were in school year 10 (ages 14-15) and 42 
were in school year 11 (ages 15-16).  Twenty-three participants were male, and 35 
were female.  All of the participants indicated their ethnicity as white British.  The 
interviews were conducted in March and April 2006 in the participants’ schools.  
All the participants were undertaking Citizenship Education classes, and as such 
this sample of 14-16 year-olds were part of the wider age cohort which had been 
in the first two years of secondary education (years 7 and 8) when compulsory 
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Citizenship Education was introduced.  As such, the sample is made up of 
participants who were part of the first group of pupils to reach their mid-teenage 
years having had Citizenship Education since the age of 11 and 12.   
Access to schools was negotiated by writing to head teachers requesting 
permission to conduct the research in their school.  Following initial agreement 
from head teachers, further discussions regarding the research were then 
conducted with the members of staff responsible for the teaching of citizenship.  
Informed consent was also collected from the participants themselves – given that 
the interviews took place on school premises, it was important to ensure that 
students were not led to view participation in the study as a ‘natural’ extension of 
their taught classes, and as such potentially view their participation as expected of 
them by their class teacher.  Our communications and discussions with head 
teachers and class teachers sought to specify this, and we tried as far as possible to 
impress this upon the participants themselves.  The research received ethical 
approval from York St John University’s institutional ethics committee.   
 
Interviews 
The interviews were designed to elicit small group discussion amongst 
young people on a broad array of topics that might be subsumed under the general 
heading of ‘citizenship’.  Group interviews were used in order to enable the 
collection of data which featured more discussion than might be the case between 
a single interviewee and interviewer.  Participants were interviewed by a single 
interviewer in groups of 2-4.  Seventeen interviews were conducted with pairs of 
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participants, four interviews involved groups of three participants, and three 
interviews involved groups of four participants. 
The interview schedule was based in part on previous research (e.g. 
Condor & Gibson, 2007; Lister et al, 2003), as well as including questions 
specifically generated for this project.  Seven main questions covering topics such 
as the single European currency, military service, social inequality, jobs, 
immigration and Britishness, political participation and environmental issues were 
printed on cards and presented one at a time, with the interviewer using follow-up 
prompts as necessary.  In keeping with the general spirit of discursive 
interviewing (see e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987, pp.163-5), as little as possible in 
the interviews was standardized, other than the presentation of the main question 
cards.  This extended to the use of seven different interviewers (five females and 
two males, including the author).  Participants were free to direct discussion 
towards their own interests and concerns, though interviewers sought as far as 
possible to keep discussions from ranging too far from the specific question asked.  
Interviews were audio-recorded and lasted between 20 and 45 minutes.  
Transcriptions were rendered in standard orthography and produced for the entire 
dataset.  The rationale for this was to allow for analysis of any and all of the 
interview material, rather than just those portions pre-defined as analytically 
interesting. 
  
Analytic procedure 
The analysis undertaken for the present paper proceeded from within a 
broadly social constructionist framework (see e.g. Burr, 2003).  Rather than 
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treating the data as representative of underlying ‘thoughts’, ‘opinions’ or 
‘feelings’, or as a window on to social ‘reality’, the analysis was concerned with 
the accounting practices and rhetorical strategies employed. 
Initial selection of data proceeded from the repeated reading and re-
reading of the transcripts which pointed to the potential contrast between 
commonsense explanations of unemployment offered in different contexts within 
the interview setting.  Instances of talk around issues concerning un/employment 
were extracted from the dataset and categorized according to the rhetorical 
strategies used by participants.   The next stage of analysis involved comparing 
data from different parts of the same interview and across different interviews, 
and, during the process of identifying rhetorical strategies, comparing instances of 
each type of strategy which one another, and with alternative strategies.  Of 
particular use at this stage was the technique of deviant case analysis (see e.g. 
Wiggins & Potter, 2008).  This involved deliberately seeking out instances within 
the dataset which appeared to contradict, or otherwise cause problems for, the 
emerging analytic narrative. 
 Microanalysis of individual segments of data drew on the specific 
techniques of discursive and rhetorical psychology, including a focus on issues of 
accountability (e.g. Buttny, 1993), fact construction (e.g. Potter, 1996) and the 
management of stake and interest (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992), as well as, 
crucially, the identification of instances of the use of rhetorical commonplaces and 
competing ideological themes.  If the earlier stages of the analysis can be 
characterized as involving an attention to the broad types of rhetorical strategies 
used, then this stage involved a focus on the specific constructions used in the 
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formulation of these strategies, and the functions of these constructions.  
Functions were identified at two broad levels – those performed within the 
interactional context of the research interview (e.g. blaming, accounting, self-
presentation), and the potentially more distal functions of the use of particular 
rhetorical strategies (e.g. social inclusion/exclusion).  As noted above, these are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive – the same utterance can perform both types of 
functions – but ultimately the distinction is between those functions which pertain 
to the immediate local context, and those which legitimate particular ways of 
organising the world or structuring society.  It should be emphasised that this part 
of the analysis fed back into the previous stage.  In this respect, the analysis was 
not linear, but iterative. 
 
Analysis 
The analysis proceeded with the identification of all instances of talk about 
un/employment.  The majority of these occurred in discussions following from 
three question cards:  What is the most important job in society?; Is social 
inequality a problem today?; and Some people have suggested that people who 
move to this country should take a test to see how British they are.  Do you think 
that this is a good idea?
1
  Within these discussions, talk about un/employment 
tended to take one of two broad forms.  Whereas the first of these questions 
tended to lead – usually by way of further follow-up prompts – to explicit 
discussions of un/employment rights and responsibilities, the latter two questions 
often resulted in discussions of un/employment in relation to immigration.  This 
distinction can be understood broadly in terms of the distinction between use in 
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theory and use in practice (cf. Potter & Litton, 1985).  Whereas the former 
discussions involved relatively direct questions concerning participants’ 
‘thoughts’ about un/employment rights and responsibilities which led participants 
to outline general positional statements regarding un/employment welfare, the 
latter discussions typically featured the use of un/employment as a practical 
rhetorical resource.  The following outline of the analysis will deal with these two 
types of discussion in turn. 
 
Un/employment rights and responsibilities in theory 
 Of particular interest is the way in which participants invoked themes of 
‘effort’ and/or ‘laziness’ in order to resolve dilemmas between, broadly speaking, 
the right to welfare and the responsibility to contribute to society.  As will be 
apparent from some of the extracts presented below, this dilemma was frequently 
a function of the interviewer’s line of questioning. 
 
The responsibility to ‘make an effort’ 
When discussing unemployment welfare, participants oriented to a 
normative work ethic.  Notably, in several interviews (N = 12) participants drew 
upon a trope of effortfulness (Gibson, 2009), in which ‘making an effort’, 
‘willingness’ to work, or not being ‘lazy’ were invoked as pre-conditions for the 
receipt of unemployment benefits.  For example: 
 
Extract 1:  ‘Because they’re lazy’ 
1 I: Yeah.  OK.  And do you think that everybody has the 
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2  right to have a job? 
3 Lee: Yeah. 
4 Mick: Yeah. 
5 I: Yeah. 
6 Lee: Uhuh. 
7 I: Why’s that? 
8 Lee: Because everybody, has the same rights as everybody 
9  else so I don’t see why, one person should- shouldn’t 
10  have a job, so. 
11 I: Uhuh, yeah? 
12 Lee: Yeah. 
13 I: So do you think that everyone should have to work 
14  then? 
15 Mick: Well it should be up to them.  They should all have the 
16  option of being able to work, but it should be their 
17  choice. 
18 I: So if it’s their choice, do you think they should be 
19  entitled to support then, if you’ve just chosen not to 
20  work? 
21 Mick: Well if they have a reason that they can’t work – 
22 Lee: Yeah, if they’re – if they’re like disabled or got some 
23  other reason then – 
24 I: Yeah. 
25 Lee: But, people that just choose not to work, then – 
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26 Mick: Because they’re lazy then no. 
27 Lee: Yeah, no. 
(Mick & Lee, year 11)
2
 
The first thing worthy of note about this extract is that it displays a number of 
features which are fairly typical of semi-structured interviewing.  For instance, 
what Potter and Hepburn (2005) refer to as the ‘flooding’ of the interaction with 
the concerns of social science researchers is apparent in the direct questions 
concerning the ‘right’ to have a job (ll. 1-2), ‘entitle[ment]’ to support (l. 19) and 
so on.  Equally we can see how the talk of the interviewer and interviewees is 
constitutive of the institutional character of the interview-as-an-interview insofar 
as the interviewer’s turns consist of a series of questions concerning what the 
participants ‘think’ (e.g. l. 1; l. 13; l. 18) as well as minimal receipt tokens (e.g. l. 
5; l. 24:  ‘yeah’) and follow-up prompts (e.g. l. 11:  ‘Uhuh, yeah?’).  The 
respondents provide a series of answers to the interviewer’s questions, without 
asking any questions of their own.  Similarly, the interviewer does not construct 
any turns as reports of her own ‘thoughts’ or ‘opinions’. 
As numerous authors have pointed out (e.g. Roulston, 2006; Wooffitt & 
Widdicombe, 2006), these, and other features of interview talk mark it out as quite 
different from other discursive contexts.  In this respect, we should therefore be 
careful about implying that the discussion simply represents some general instance 
of ‘discourse’, as if this same interaction could have happened in any context.  It is 
clearly an interview, and, notably, the interviewer’s turns are evidently crucial in 
shaping the interaction insofar as the questions are fairly directive.  It is the 
interviewer who introduces the issue of ‘right[s]’ which occasions first minimal 
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agreement (ll. 3-4: ‘yeah’) from Mick and Lee, and then, following the 
interviewer’s receipt token (l. 5: ‘yeah’) and prompt (l. 7:  Why’s that?’), Lee’s 
formulation of something approximating a liberal rights-based version of 
citizenship predicated on a notion of universal entitlement (ll. 8-10:  ‘everybody, 
has the same rights as everybody else’).  It is the interviewer who then introduces 
the themes of duty and compulsion (ll. 13-14):  ‘do you think that everyone should 
have to work then?’), in response to which Mick formulates an answer based 
around the principle of ‘choice’ (ll. 15-17).  The interviewer then contrasts the 
principles of universal rights and freedom of choice by asking a question which 
implies possible incompatibility between the two.  Specifically, the entitlement to 
‘support’ is queried for those who have exercised a ‘choice’ to remain 
unemployed.  Of potential importance here is the use of ‘just’ in the construction 
of a hypothetical group of people who have ‘just chosen not to work’ (ll. 19-20), 
which constructs such persons as having no good reason for their choice (see Lee, 
1987, on the functions of just).  This turn therefore positions Mick and Lee’s 
responses on the issue thus far as potentially incompatible, and as therefore 
requiring a further account. 
To suggest that Mick and Lee’s subsequent turns on lines 21-27 represent 
the resolution of an ideological dilemma which was simply present in their talk 
independently of the interviewer’s turns would therefore be inappropriate, and 
would represent an instance of analysis taking place in what Widdicombe and 
Wooffitt (1995, p. 64) refer to as an ‘interactional vacuum’.  Nevertheless, 
following Wetherell (1998, 2003) we might still suggest that even here, the 
specific interactional nature of the interview context is not sufficient to explain the 
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turns at lines 21-27.  Here, we see the dilemmatic tension introduced by the 
interviewer resolved through Mick and Lee’s joint construction of a contrast 
between a category of people who ‘have a reason that they can’t work’, with Lee 
offering the example of disability, and a category of people who are ‘lazy’.  To 
point to the ways in which this is worked up in response to a series of direct 
questions from the interviewer, and is therefore constructed by Mick and Lee in 
order to perform the very specific business of demonstrating consistency in what 
they ‘think’ in the local context of the interview, is not to deny the importance of 
pointing to the links between this formulation and the themes of cultural 
commonsense.  We may note, for example, how the assumptions embodied in the 
use of ‘lazy’ are those noted by Edelman (1977) and Billig et al (1988) as 
representing a commonsense individualistic explanation of social disadvantage.  
Such cultural resources therefore potentially function ideologically to sustain an 
individualistic conception of unemployment which ultimately positions people as 
responsible for their own employment circumstances. 
 Of course Billig et al (1988) pointed out that individualistic explanations 
of poverty, unemployment, and so on are only one pole of an individual-social 
dilemma, and in the following extract we can see a participant orientating to this 
opposing explanation.  The following extract provides a further contrast with 
extract 1 insofar as one participant argues that paid employment constitutes a 
responsibility.  However, the basic assumption of the necessity of individual effort 
remains: 
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Extract 2:  ‘make proof that they’re making an effort’ 
1 I: Yeah?  Good stuff.  What about sort of in general, do 
2  you think people should have to work?  Or do you think 
3  it’s all right if people don’t want to have a job? 
4 Tim: No, I think people should work, even if it’s just like a 
5  part-time job. 
6 I: Yeah. 
7 Tim: Because it’s not fair on everyone else if like people 
8  work and – if people work and they’re paying for other 
9  people sitting on their bums doing nothing, I don’t think 
10  that’s very fair. 
11 Rob: They always say they can’t get a job but there’s plenty 
12  of opportunities out there.  I mean all you have to do is 
13  look in like newspapers and that and there’ll be a job 
14  in there. 
15 Tim: And yeah, you’ve got to work your way up haven’t 
16  you?   
17 Rob: Yeah. 
18 Tim: So you’ve got to start somewhere. 
19 I: Yeah.  What about erm, people who, I don’t know, for 
20  whatever reason, they can’t get a job.  Do you think 
21  they should be entitled to some support? 
22 Rob: Yeah. 
23 Tim: Yeah.  I do, because, they could have like bad back- 
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24  bad backgrounds and like want to pick themselves up. 
25  I think that they should like, if they’re willing to do it 
26  then they should, you know, get a chance. 
27 I: Yeah.  So when would you – so you’d support people 
28  then who can’t get a job but also they’ve – you know, 
29  people have got to get a job – so where do you sort of 
30  draw the cut-off line?  Have they got to do anything to 
31  get this support or? 
32 Tim: I don’t know.  They’ve got to ask for it obviously 
33  haven’t they, because – 
34 Rob: I think they’ve got to come to some sort of agreement 
35  that if they’re gonna, like, get benefits, they have to 
36  start applying for jobs and make proof that they are 
37  doing it. 
38 Tim: Yeah, make proof that they’re making an effort. 
39  Because if they’re not making an effort then they 
40  shouldn’t get aided should they, because it’s not – 
41 I: Sure. 
(Tim & Rob, year 11) 
The interviewer’s initial question directs the participants to provide a ‘general’ 
account, and we may again note how the dilemmatic tension between rights and 
responsibilities is introduced by the interviewer (ll. 1-3), with Tim then arguing 
that people should undertake some form of paid employment.  Tim articulates a 
position whereby the potentially unfair effects of someone not working outweigh 
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any right to choose to remain unemployed (l. 7:  ‘it’s not fair on everybody else’).  
The interviewer’s question is also significant insofar as it constructs a category of 
people who ‘don’t want to have a job’ (l. 3).  As in extract 1, the possibility that 
someone may freely choose not to enter paid employment is explained by Tim in 
terms of laziness, albeit in this instance with a colloquial reference to ‘people 
sitting on their bums doing nothing’ (l. 9).  This is reinforced by Rob’s suggestion 
that it is in fact easy to find employment, with the impression being created of a 
category of people who cannot even make the effort to carry out the simple 
activity of looking in a newspaper.  However, at this point the characterisation of 
the category of people involved has subtly changed.  Whereas the interviewer’s 
initial question referred to the hypothetical case of people who ‘don’t want to have 
a job’ (l. 3), Rob constructs a group of people who ‘say they can’t get a job’ (l. 
11).  Thus Rob not only treats not wanting to have a job as accountable, but also 
constructs the people involved as being aware of this accountability.  This allows 
him to dismiss what he constructs as the typical account offered by such 
individuals by citing the ready availability of jobs. 
 Subsequently, the interviewer’s question on lines 19-21 changes the focus 
from people who ‘say they can’t get a job’ to people who ‘can’t get a job’.  Both 
Rob and Tim offer token agreements that such individuals should be entitled to 
‘support’, before Tim expands on his answer by constructing a category of people 
who may have ‘bad backgrounds’ (ll. 23-24).  Here, then, we see the opposing 
theme of social reasons for unemployment being constructed in response to the 
interviewer’s non-specific reference to people being unable to get a job ‘for 
whatever reason’ (ll. 19-20).  However, Tim’s argument that such individuals 
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should be entitled to support is limited by the condition that they ‘want to pick 
themselves up’ and that ‘they’re willing to do it’ (ll. 24-25).  In Tim’s formulation, 
having a ‘bad background’ is not a sufficient condition to be given ‘a chance’ (l. 
26) – one first needs to want and be willing to pick oneself up. 
 As in extract 1, the interviewer’s subsequent questions on lines 27-31 
constructs the positions articulated by the respondents thus far as being potentially 
inconsistent, and as therefore necessitating further accounting work.  In response, 
Rob and Tim begin to formulate some specific conditions for the receipt of 
unemployment benefits.  Notably, the effortfulness trope is emphasised once again 
(ll. 38-39).  However, this is accompanied by a further condition – to ‘make proof’ 
that one is ‘applying for jobs’ (l. 36), and ultimately that one is ‘making an effort’ 
(l. 38).  Thus not only does one have to be willing to escape from the effects of a 
‘bad background’, and ‘make an effort’ to find employment, but one has to 
actively demonstrate that one is doing so.  We can see here how, even when a 
social explanation of unemployment is invoked, the display of individual effort is 
constructed as a basic criterion for entitlement to welfare. 
 
Disability, caring and parenting:  Exceptions to the rule? 
We have already seen in extract 1 how disability could be cited as a 
legitimate reason for not being in paid employment.  This was mentioned in 12 
interviews, and additionally in four interviews participants invoked illness/health 
problems in a broadly similar fashion.  As is the case in extract 1, these reasons 
for not being in paid employment were frequently contrasted with ‘laziness’. 
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Other participants argued that some individuals engaged in important 
unpaid forms of labour and could therefore be legitimately exempted from paid 
employment.  Notably, in some interviews in the present dataset participants 
argued that parental (N = 4) or care (N = 3) responsibilities constituted valid 
grounds for exemption from paid employment.  For example: 
 
Extract 3:  ‘if they’re caring for someone at home’ 
1 I: Erm, do you think everyone should have to work? 
2 Jack: Yeah. 
3 Kate: Mm.  (3)  But if like they’re c- if they’re caring for 
4  someone at home, then that’s kind of their job, even 
5  though th- it isn’t, an actual job.  So they don- they 
6  shouldn’t have to work.  But I think it’s - I don’t think 
7  it’s right when people just don’t work at all and they 
8  claim benefits all the time. It’s not right.  You should 
9  have to work for your money, like everyone else does. 
(Jack & Kate, year 10) 
In this extract, Kate treats the interviewer’s reference to ‘work’ as referring to paid 
employment – as evidenced by her gloss on caring as a ‘kind of’, rather than an 
‘actual’, job – but nevertheless argues for the exemption of carers from having to 
‘work’ (i.e. undertake paid employment).  We then see the construction of a 
category of people who ‘just don’t work at all and … claim benefits all the time’.  
Kate uses extreme case formulations (ECF; Pomerantz, 1986) to establish this 
category of people as particularly undeserving.  Not only do they claim benefits 
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whilst not working, they ‘don’t work at all’ and they ‘claim benefits all the time.’  
Finally, Kate cites a general principle whereby ‘you should have to work for your 
money, like everyone else does’.  Insofar as carers are doing a ‘kind of … job’ in 
return for their welfare payments, they are thus not in fact treated as genuine 
exceptions to the general rule that one must work or otherwise display effort in 
order to receive an income. 
Interestingly, parental responsibilities were alone in the present dataset in 
constituting a controversial case for exemption.  In addition to being cited as 
legitimate grounds for exemption in four interviews, in three interviews the 
opposing argument was offered – that parental responsibilities did not exempt one 
from entering paid employment.  For example: 
 
Extract 4:  ‘it’s just laziness’ 
1 I: Yeah.  Do you think people should be allowed to not 
2  work if they don’t want to work? 
3 Dina: I think they should be able to, even if it’s just a part 
4  time job for a couple of hours.  Or a few days a week 
5  or something. 
6 I: Okay. 
7 Tracy: Some mothers live on child benefits don’t they, and 
8  they don’t go to work.  Even if they’re grown up 
9  they’re still saying ‘oh no, I can’t.’  And I think that’s 
10  unfair to other people, it’s just laziness. 
(Tracy & Dina, year 10) 
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On lines 7-10 Tracy specifically applies Dina’s argument that people ‘should’ 
work to ‘mothers [who] live on child benefits’.  Through the use of a tag question 
(don’t they), Tracy treats knowledge of the existence of this category as shared 
and taken for granted.  She further specifies the problematic category as consisting 
of mothers of grown-up children, and it is notable that the use of an extreme case 
formulation (‘Even if they’re grown up’), hypothetical reported speech (‘they’re 
still saying ‘on no, I can’t’’; Myers, 1999), and the word ‘still’ creates an image of 
temporal continuity with these ‘mothers’ continuing to resist engagement in the 
labour market even when their reason for non-engagement has been removed.  
The hypothetical speech in particular can be seen as an attempt to enhance the 
factual status of her claim through the provision of an example which is presented 
not in her own voice, but through the words of others.  This allows her to conclude 
that the reason why such ‘mothers’ in fact do not work is ‘just laziness’. 
 
The rhetorical mobilization of immigration as a cause of unemployment 
 The data presented thus far seem to confirm existing analyses which point 
to the dominance of individualistic conceptions of un/employment, with disability 
being treated as the only legitimate exemption from the general rule that income 
should be contingent upon effort.  However, in order to further complicate this 
picture, the analysis concludes by exploring an extract which illustrates the way in 
which a social explanation for unemployment could be mobilised in the context of 
discussions of immigration. 
In 16 interviews issues concerning un/employment were raised by 
participants in discussions of immigration.  We can treat these discussions as 
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involving the use of un/employment ‘in practice’ insofar as un/employment was 
mobilised by participants as a rhetorical resource in the course of discussing 
immigration.  Of particular interest are eight interviews in which participants 
argued that immigration had the potential to lead to unemployment amongst the 
rest of the population.  For example: 
 
Extract 5:  ‘They could be stealing all our jobs’ 
1 Kate: Yeah, but I still think there’s too many people moving 
2  over to Britain, from different countries. 
3 I: All right that’s an interesting area to get into.  Who do 
4  you think should be allowed in? 
5 Jack: People with a trade, that can help the country. 
6 Kate: I disagree with that.  I think we’ve got our trade over 
7  here, why do we need their trade when we – we’re all 
8  right.  They could be stealing all our jobs, bringing their 
9  trade over here.  All our people are out of jobs when 
10  they were here first. 
(Jack & Kate, year 10) 
The interviewer follows up Kate’s initial turn concerning ‘people moving over to 
Britain, from different countries’, marking this as an ‘interesting’ topic shift.  This 
constructs the topic as one that the interviewer wishes to sanction further 
discussion of, and of course this shaping of the participants’ subsequent turns is 
important.  The actual question asked by the interviewer again asks the 
participants what they ‘think’, and as such discursive space is opened up to speak 
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in general terms about ‘who … should be allowed in’.  In the context of this 
formulation of her positional statement on immigration, we then see Kate mobilise 
unemployment as a rhetorical resource.  Notably, Kate counters Jack’s argument 
by suggesting that rather than ‘help[ing] the country’, immigrants ‘could be 
stealing all our jobs’.  The metaphor of theft construes immigrants’ employment 
seeking as criminally illegitimate, and the use of ECFs (‘all our jobs’; ‘All our 
people’) constitutes the problem as acutely serious.  Thus Kate argues that 
immigrants, no matter how well qualified, have no rights to seek employment in 
Britain, reserving such rights for ‘our people’. 
 Moreover, in this extract we see a clear example of a social explanation for 
unemployment.  Kate treats the arrival of people with a ‘trade’ from ‘different 
countries’ as causing ‘all our people’ to be ‘out of jobs’.  This provides a contrast 
with her earlier argument in which she constructed a category of people who 
‘don’t work at all and … claim benefits all the time’ (see extract 3) which drew 
upon the normative work ethic common in discussions of un/employment in 
theory. 
In this context, then, the agency of individual members of ‘our people’ is 
treated as potentially limited by immigration.  Whereas previously, individuals 
who find themselves unemployed were exhorted to ‘make an effort’, with the 
underlying assumption that unemployment may be the result of laziness, in the 
context of discussions concerning immigration, an alternative version of 
unemployment could be constructed by participants – one in which ‘our people’ 
were helpless victims of the process of immigration.  These arguments construct 
two contrasting versions of human agency – an individualistic conception of 
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humans as being relatively unconstrained agents, and a conception of humans as 
being at the mercy of social and economic processes beyond their control.  What 
is striking about the present data is that both of these conceptions can be used to 
argue for exclusion from claiming social citizenship rights.  When un/employment 
was constructed as a matter of individual effort, social rights could be denied to 
those who do not display this effort.  When un/employment was treated as a 
matter of processes of immigration, social rights could be denied to those who are 
not members of the polity. 
 
Discussion 
 The present study has demonstrated the ways in which ideological themes 
of social citizenship, agency and membership are constructed, wrestled with and 
resolved in the research interview talk of a sample of 14-16 year-olds in Northern 
England.  In discussions of un/employment in theory tensions between rights and 
responsibilities could be resolved through the invocation of the work ethic and the 
construction of the ‘effortful citizen’ (cf. Gibson, 2009).  However, in discussions 
of immigration, an alternative criterion based around membership could also be 
constructed.  This effectively constructed unemployment amongst the resident 
population of the UK as the result of socio-economic processes of migration.  This 
variation need not be seen as evidence of the limitations of human discursive 
consciousness, or even as necessarily contradictory.  Whereas previous research 
which has studied popular discourse on welfare has tended to treat such findings 
as a problem which the analyst must seek to address through tracing consistencies 
in participants’ reasoning, it is possible to suggest that these individual and social 
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explanations for unemployment represent different commonsense ways of talking 
about unemployment which are occasioned by the contexts in which they occur.   
Notably, in extracts 1 and 2 the participants whose utterances were 
constructed by the interviewer as being potentially inconsistent sought to resolve 
this through the construction of a criterion of effortfulness.  Equally, participants 
who constructed unemployment in both individual and social terms might seek to 
construct consistencies in their lines of argument themselves if they were worked 
up as being in need of clarification.  Importantly, however, this would depend 
upon these lines of argument being worked up as contradictory in the first place.  
To do this as part of the analysis, as has been done in previous research, is to step 
momentarily outside of the analytic mode and to engage in the very arguments 
which our participants themselves have been debating.  As will by now be clear, 
this represents a key shift from many previous analyses of citizenship talk in that 
the status of any given line of argument as inherently contradictory or not is 
treated as a participants’ concern, rather than as a matter for the analyst. 
 A further way in which the present findings point to a more complicated 
picture than suggested by previous research on popular conceptions of welfare and 
social citizenship is in their implications for our understanding of the ‘dominance’ 
of one ideology over another.  Based on the first part of the present analysis, it 
may be suggested that an individualistic conception of unemployment appears to 
dominate over what, following Dean (2004), we might refer to as a ‘solidaristic’ 
ideology.  However, this is only the case when discussing un/employment in 
theory.  The fact that many social scientific approaches (both qualitative and 
quantitative) rely on participants’ responses to direct questions concerning their 
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‘thoughts’ on the topic of interest to the researcher may account for why previous 
research has tended to find individualistic ideology dominating.  In contrast, when 
we explore how participants construct unemployment in relation to immigration, 
we see something quite different.  It is therefore difficult to maintain the image of 
individualistic ideologies dominating over solidaristic ones when confronted with 
formulations which prioritise the employment rights of one’s fellow citizens over 
those of ‘immigrants’.  Moreover, this variety of ‘solidarity’ is clearly 
circumscribed by state borders – the corollary of solidarity with one’s fellow 
citizens here is the exclusion of non-citizens (cf. Billig, 1995). 
The consequence of this line of argument is, therefore, to suggest that 
rather than seeing solidaristic discourses as necessarily providing a potential 
antidote to individualistic conceptions of social citizenship (cf. Dean, 2004), the 
potentially exclusionary nature of both should be considered.  Whereas 
conceptions of welfare entitlement based around ‘effort’ function to hold 
individual co-nationals to account for their own status as unemployed, so those 
conceptions which display ‘solidarity’ with co-nationals function to deny social 
citizenship rights for those defined as not belonging to this group.  Following the 
arguments of authors such as Wetherell and Potter (1992) and Billig et al. (1988), 
we might therefore suggest that these ways of talking about social citizenship 
rights and responsibilities potentially serve to reinforce a series of ideological 
assumptions around who is entitled to welfare, and what those entitlements are 
contingent upon. 
It should be emphasised that the limited nature of the sample points to the 
need for further research exploring these issues with more diverse groups of 
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participants.  Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the 
present study which demand exploration in future work.  First, it is notable that for 
these respondents, questions concerning the commonsense psychology of 
individuals were inseparable from debates concerning who should and shouldn’t 
be entitled to receive unemployment benefits.  As discursive psychologists have 
noted, psychological terms are used to perform social actions in a variety of 
contexts (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  In particular, the use of terms such as ‘effort’ 
and ‘laziness’ to formulate judgments concerning the merits of welfare claimants 
suggests the availability not only of a generally individualistic conception of 
social citizenship rights and responsibilities, but also of a conception of rights as 
specifically contingent upon displaying certain psychological characteristics.  The 
ideological function of such accounts is to predicate social citizenship rights on 
individual psychology, and ultimately to legitimize the denial of social citizenship 
as being the result of a fair system which rewards individual ‘effort’ and punishes 
‘laziness’ (see also Gibson, 2009).  Such a set of assumptions inevitably neglects 
the possibility that individual psychology could be inextricably bound up with 
social processes, and reinforces what Rose (1999, p. 269) describes as the 
government of those identified as having ‘pathologies of the will’.  That such 
assumptions are mobilised by a group of young people who have received formal 
educational instruction in citizenship is suggestive of the ideological effects of 
attempts to equip young people with the ‘cultural capital’ necessary to constitute 
themselves as competent citizens, and whilst any suggestion of a direct causal 
linkage between educational programmes and responses to social scientific 
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interview questions should be treated as grossly speculative, it is nevertheless 
striking that these accounts are so readily constructed. 
Second, it is worth reflecting on the connections between the analysis 
presented here and recent debates concerning the identification of ideological 
themes in discourse.  The present study has sought to attend to both the local 
contextual and more distal ideological foci current in discursive and rhetorical 
psychologies.  Of course, such a strategy carries with it the risk of failing to satisfy 
advocates of either approach, but it is my contention that both are necessary for a 
complete discourse analytic approach (cf. Wetherell, 1998).  Both individual and 
social explanations of unemployment were constructed in order to perform 
specific actions within the local context of the interview.  As several 
commentators have noted (e.g. Potter & Hepburn, 2005; Wooffitt, 2005), any 
analysis which fails to recognise the local function of discourse is in danger of 
grossly oversimplifying matters.  Yet these explanations of unemployment are still 
recognisable as the individual and social ‘myths’ noted by Edelman (1977) and 
Billig et al (1988), and any approach which treats them exclusively as the product 
of the type of interaction in which they occur is potentially neglecting the wider 
ideological function of constructions such as these – as argued above, both 
individual and social explanations have the potential to legitimate exclusionary 
practices. 
Ultimately, the matter is an empirical one, and in this respect we begin to 
return to the idea of the discursive study of ideology as a cumulative enterprise 
which might proceed by the successive mapping of ideological functions across a 
variety of contexts.  Whilst particular ideological formulations should be studied 
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in their specificity, the search for patterning across datasets (as is common for 
local interactional functions in Conversation Analysis) should be equally possible.  
Indeed, this is already a feature of much ideology work in discursive and 
rhetorical psychologies.  The basic thrust of this over-arching position is, 
therefore, that while attention to both interaction and ideology is necessary for 
discursive and rhetorical psychologies, neither is sufficient in isolation. 
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1
 In 2005 the UK Government introduced the ‘Life in the UK test’ to be taken by people seeking 
British citizenship (see http://www.lifeintheuktest.gov.uk).   At the time of its launch Government 
ministers emphasised that it did not constitute a test of Britishness (see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4391710.stm). 
2
 All names reported are pseudonyms. 
